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Disney in France Until 1992, the Walt Disney Company had…
Disney in France
Until 1992, the Walt Disney Company had experienced nothing but success in the
theme park business. Its first park, Disneyland, opened in Anaheim, California, in 1955.
Its theme song, “It’s a Small World After All,” promoted “an idealized vision of exotic
cultures all calculated to promote heartwarming feelings about living together as one
happy family. There were dark tunnels and bumpy rides to scare the children a little but
none of the terrors of the real world…The Disney characters that everyone knew from the
cartoons and comic books were on hand to shepherd the guest and to direct them to the
Mickey Mouse watches and Little Mermaid records.” The Anaheim park was an instant
success.
In the 1970s, the triumph was repeated in Florida, and in 1983, Disney proved the
Japanese also have an affinity for Mickey Mouse with the successful opening of Tokyo
Disneyland. Having wooed the Japanese, Disney executives in 1986 turned their
attention to France and, more specifically, to Paris, the self-proclaimed capital of
European high culture and style. “Why did they pick France?” many asked. When word
first got out that Disney wanted to build another international theme parks, officials from
more than 200 locations all over the world descended on Disney with pleas and cash
inducements to work the Disney magic in their hometowns. But Paris was chosen
because of demographics and subsidies. About 17 million Europeans live less than a
two-hour drive from Paris. Another 310 million can fly there in the same time or less.
Also, the French government was so eager to attract Disney that it offered the company
more than $1 billion in various incentives, all in the expectation that the project would
create 30,000 French jobs.
Despite the fact that Tokyo Disneyland was considered by guest to be exactly the
same as U.S. Disneylands, Disney executives considered some possible changes for Euro
Disney. Market research indicated that Europeans who traveled to the U.S. wanted to see
New York, Disneyland, and the western U.S. Thus, EuroDisney made the theme park the
most Western. Disney also emphasized that the origin of their characters was European.
EuroDisney also featured different foods from all around the world and had adopted
French as its first language. In anticipation of the French’s intolerance for waiting in
lines, Disney planned films to entertain visitors while waiting in line.
From the beginning, cultural gaffes by Disney set the tone for the project. There
was snipping from Parisian intellectuals who attacked the transplantation of Disney’s
dream world as an assault on French culture; “a cultural Chernobyl,” one prominent
intellectual called it. The minister of culture announced he would boycott the opening,
proclaiming it to be an unwelcome symbol of American clichés and a consumer society.
Unperturbed Disney pushed ahead with the planned summer 1992 opening of the $5
billion park. Shortly after EuroDisney opened, French farmers drove their tractors to the
entrance and blocked it. This globally televised act of protest was aimed not at Disney
but at the U.S. government, which had been demanding that French agricultural subsidies
be cut. Still, it focused world attention on the loveless marriage of Disney and Paris.
Then there were the operational issues. Disney’s policy of serving no alcohol in
the park, since reversed, caused astonishment in a country where a glass of wine for
lunch is a given. Disney thought that Monday would be a light day for visitors and
Friday a heavy one and allocated staff accordingly, but the reality was the reverse.
Another unpleasant surprise was the hotel breakfast debacle. “We were told that
Europeans ‘don’t take breakfast,’ so we downsized the restaurants,” recalled one Disney
executive. “And guess what? Everybody showed up for breakfast. We were trying to
serve 2,500 breakfasts in a 350-seat restaurant at some of the hotels. The lines were
horrendous. Moreover, they didn’t want the typical French breakfast of croissants and
coffee, which was our assumption. They wanted bacon and eggs.” Lunch turned out to
be another problem. “Everybody wanted lunch at 12:30. The crowds were huge. Our
smiling cast members had to calm down surly patrons and engage in some ‘behavior
modification’ to teach them that they could eat lunch at 11:00 a.m. or 2:00 p.m.”
There were major staffing problems too. Disney had to select 10,000 employees
within a period of six months. As always, interviewers looked for friendliness and
warmth. Employees were to be paid approximately 15% above the minimum wage. The
company’s goal of hiring a multi-cultural employee base was not accomplished. Some
270 managers were cross-trained and an additional 200 were imported prior to the
opening. The staff experienced housing problems as the nearby town did not have
apartment space to house the Disney employees and the wages paid were not enough to
cover Parisian housing. Disney tried to use the same teamwork model with its staff that had worked so
well in American and Japan, but it ran into trouble in France. In the first nine weeks of
EuroDisney’s operation, roughly 1000 employees, 10% of the total, left. One former
employee was a 22-year-old medical student from a nearby town who signed up for a
weekend job. After two days of “brainwashing,” as he called Disney’s training, he left
following a dispute with his supervisors over the timing of his lunch hour. Another
former employee noted, “I don’t think that they realize what Europeans are like…that we
ask questions and don’t think all the same way.” Disney managers admitted that the
employees worked under some tough conditions during the opening.
Disney’s dream of making people happy was achieved through a complex
integration of park design, operating details, and human resource policies and practices
that helped achieve the standard of service that represented Disney. For example, Disney
taught its employees a specific language representative of their culture. Thus employees
were called “cast members” who wore “costumes” and were cast in a “role.” Very strict
dress and grooming standards were applied. Extensive training emphasized how to
deliver an outstanding customer experience. Disney opened a training center to train the
EuroDisney employees. Despite much training, customer reactions were mixed. Some
American visitors noted that the employees acted more like real people than like
“Disney” people. Part of the problem was the employee reaction to strict standards of
grooming that went against French individuality, as well as the fact that the employees
were always unsure as to what language they would be addressed in given the
multicultural nature of the customers.
One of the biggest problems, however, was that Europeans didn’t stay at the park
as long as Disney expected. While Disney succeeded in getting close to 9 million visitors
a year through the park gates, in line with its plans, most stayed only a day or two. Few
stayed the four to five days that Disney had hoped for. It seems that most Europeans
regard theme parks as places for day excursions. A theme park is not seen as a
destination for an extended vacation. This was a big shock to Disney. The company had
invested billions in building luxury hotels next to the park- hotels that the day-trippers Another unpleasant surprise was the hotel breakfast debacle. “We were told that Europeans ‘don’t take breakfast,’ so we downsized the restaurants,” recalled one Disney executive. “And guess what? Everybody showed up for breakfast. We were trying to
serve 2,500 breakfasts in a 350-seat restaurant at some of the hotels. The lines were
horrendous. Moreover, they didn’t want the typical French breakfast of croissants and
coffee, which was our assumption. They wanted bacon and eggs.” Lunch turned out to
be another problem. “Everybody wanted lunch at 12:30. The crowds were huge. Our
smiling cast members had to calm down surly patrons and engage in some ‘behavior
modification’ to teach them that they could eat lunch at 11:00 a.m. or 2:00 p.m.”
There were major staffing problems too. Disney had to select 10,000 employees
within a period of six months. As always, interviewers looked for friendliness and
warmth. Employees were to be paid approximately 15% above the minimum wage. The
company’s goal of hiring a multi-cultural employee base was not accomplished. Some
270 managers were cross-trained and an additional 200 were imported prior to the
opening. The staff experienced housing problems as the nearby town did not have
apartment space to house the Disney employees and the wages paid were not enough to
cover Parisian housing.
Disney tried to use the same teamwork model with its staff that had worked so
well in American and Japan, but it ran into trouble in France. In the first nine weeks of
EuroDisney’s operation, roughly 1000 employees, 10% of the total, left. One former
employee was a 22-year-old medical student from a nearby town who signed up for a
weekend job. After two days of “brainwashing,” as he called Disney’s training, he left
following a dispute with his supervisors over the timing of his lunch hour. Another
former employee noted, “I don’t think that they realize what Europeans are like…that we
ask questions and don’t think all the same way.” Disney managers admitted that the
employees worked under some tough conditions during the opening.
Disney’s dream of making people happy was achieved through a complex
integration of park design, operating details, and human resource policies and practices
that helped achieve the standard of service that represented Disney. For example, Disney
taught its employees a specific language representative of their culture. Thus employees
were called “cast members” who wore “costumes” and were cast in a “role.” Very strict
dress and grooming standards were applied. Extensive training emphasized how to
deliver an outstanding customer experience. Disney opened a training center to train the
EuroDisney employees. Despite much training, customer reactions were mixed. Some
American visitors noted that the employees acted more like real people than like
“Disney” people. Part of the problem was the employee reaction to strict standards of
grooming that went against French individuality, as well as the fact that the employees
were always unsure as to what language they would be addressed in given the
multicultural nature of the customers.
One of the biggest problems, however, was that Europeans didn’t stay at the park
as long as Disney expected. While Disney succeeded in getting close to 9 million visitors
a year through the park gates, in line with its plans, most stayed only a day or two. Few
stayed the four to five days that Disney had hoped for. It seems that most Europeans
regard theme parks as places for day excursions. A theme park is not seen as a
destination for an extended vacation. This was a big shock to Disney. The company had
invested billions in building luxury hotels next to the park- hotels that the day-trippers didn’t need and that stood half empty most of the time. To make matters worse, the French didn’t show up in the expected numbers. In 1994, only 40% of the park’s visitors were French. One puzzled executive noted that many visitors were Americans living in
Europe or, stranger still, Japanese on European vacation! As a result, by the end of 1994
EuroDisney had cumulative losses of $2 billion. At this point, EuroDisney changed its
strategy. First, the company changed the name to Disneyland Paris in an attempt to
strengthen the park’s identity. Second, food and fashion offerings changed. To quote
one manager, “We opened restaurants providing French-style food service, but we found
that customers wanted self-service like in the U.S. parks. Similarly, products in the
boutiques were initially toned down for the French market, but since then the range has
changed to give it a more definite Disney image.” Third, the prices for day tickets and
hotel rooms were cut by one-third. The result was an attendance of 11.7 million in 1996,
up from a low of 8.8 million in 1994.
Sources: Most of this case comes from C. Hill, International Business, (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2003),
pp.119-121). Additional information came from. Anthony, “Euro-Disney: The First 100 days,” Harvard
Business School Case # 9-693-013.
Sources: P. Gumble and R. Turner, “Mouse Trap: Fans Like Euro Disney But Its Parent’s Goofs Weigh the
Park Down,” Wall Street Journal, March 10, 1994, p. A1; R.J. Barnett and j. Cavanagh, Global Dreams
(New York: Touchstone Books, 1994), pp.33-34; J. Huey, “Eisner Explains Everything,” Fortune, April
17, 1995, pp. 45-68; R. Anthony, “Euro-Disney: The First 100 days,” Harvard Business School Case # 9-
693-013; and Charles Masters, “French Fall for the Charms of Disney,” Sunday Telegraph, April 13, 1997,
p.21.
1. What does Disney sell? What are the mechanisms they use to deliver their product (list all the ones you think help Disney deliver their product)? What do people outside of the U.S. expect of Disney?
2. What changes did the management team do in opening the Paris location? Analyze each change as to whether it makes sense based on your answer to #2. Why did they have problems?
3. What do you recommend Disney do differently?
